This paper examines the economics of traveler information from probe vehicles. Probes differ from permanently installed roadway detection devices both because they provide less current information and because an information system centered on this technology can be organized in the form of private clubs rather than a government agency. The paper estimates the quality of service associated with various shares of probes among the fleet. The paper than simulates the value of information from probes, to estimate the number or share of probe vehicles necessary to provide useful information in the cases of recurring and non-recurring congestion. When there is non-recurring congestion, a low frequency of probes is sufficient to detect the incident and enable information consumers to choose alternates. However, smoothing the stochastic nature of traffic in the case of recurring congestion requires a relatively high share of probes (up to one-third of the fleet), depending on the level of congestion.
Introduction
Why isn't an accurate system telling commuters the fastest route to their destination in real time widely deployed? The component technologies to provide this information have been tested for over a decade. Transportation analysts can find the shortest route between two points given the times on each link with modern computers. Communications systems can transmit the request for information and the result between a mobile phone and a base station. Devices can display that information in the vehicle.
One significant problem is the lack of data, transportation agencies still cannot tell users the travel speed on each segment of the freeway network, much less the arterial system. While many technologies (loop detectors, video cameras, laser, radar guns) can measure link speed, none are sufficiently cheap and reliable and none have been installed ubiquitously.
An institutional economist might argue that the information is not available because the incentive structure is wrong. Public highway agencies have no explicit incentive to reduce travelers' time or increase the number of users. There is no reward for efficiency, it may even lead to less new construction, less staff, and less budget. That suggests considering alternative sources and institutional arrangements for how an information provider get its information. There are alternatives to the conventional answer of publicly controlled permanent monitoring stations on the freeway (cameras, loop detectors, etc.). This paper considers one approach, where consumers of travel information become producers as well, by acting as probes to update times for an information provider and thus provide accurate information for the next consumer. More probe vehicles (members) imply more value for the club. The information provided can remain within a network (club), so that the larger the club, the more valuable it is. Though there may be multiple sustainable clubs (and diminishing marginal returns to club size), small clubs are less valuable than large ones.
The disadvantage of probes is that coverage is still incomplete. A low share of probes results in insufficiently fresh information, which may be unable to be used to smooth out the daily random variations in traffic. Conditions may change between the time information is collected and the time it is presented to a series of drivers. Several drivers will possess the same dated facts, and act incorrectly on them. This paper will estimate the coverage levels necessary for positive outcomes for both recurring and nonrecurring congestion. This paper begins with a review of the literature on the use of probes for providing ATIS data.
Then we consider the issue of who provides ATIS. This is followed by a discussion of the network externalities resulting from a club of probe vehicles. We then examine the issue of how much network coverage is provided by any given share of probe vehicles. The model we use in our simulations is developed, and then applied to cases of both recurring and non-recurring traffic. We summarize our results and conclude with some thoughts about sources of real-time traffic information. Boyce, Hicks and Sen (1991) estimate the number of vehicle probes needed to monitor link travel times adequately during peak periods. They use a simulation model for suburban northeast Illinois to solve a static user equilibrium route choice for the given network during the 2-hour morning peak period. The authors conclude that about 4,700 vehicle probes are needed to traverse 50% of all arterial links every 5 minutes. But the number drops down to less than 1,200 if the time interval extending to 20 minutes. Rakha and Van Aerde (1995) assessed the accuracy of vehicle probe estimates using a small scale field test in Orlando Florida. They found that vehicle probes underestimated the trip duration for all of the nine test runs, with an average error is about -12 percent, and a standard deviation of approximately 7 percent. It is noteworthy that the trip-travel-time error decreased as the average link-travel time increased.
Literature Review
Furthermore, the discrepancy is speculated to be a result of technical constraints as the probe vehicles could only transmit three link-travel time reports per minute. However, the average link-travel-time error did not exceed four seconds, and the percentage error decreases as the average link-travel time increased. The authors speculate that the discrepancy was caused by inconsistently attributing delay at an intersection to the upstream link versus downstream link. During the statistical tests comparing probes and loops, a statistically significant non-zero intercept and non-unity slope were present in a regression model between two sources of estimates. Sen et al (1997) estimated the number of probes per unit time required to measure the mean travel time. They also examined the relationship between the variance of the mean travel time and number of probes, taking into account explicitly the temporal and spatial interdependence of link travel times. They use data from the suburban Chicago ADVANCE project during the summer of 1995. Link travel time data were transmitted in real time from probe vehicles driven down two pre-specified routes of 12 links.
Dependence occurs due both to the similarity of entry times from upstream links and because of the similarity of cycle phase encountered. Two regression models were performed. The first one was the expected value of mean travel time against time of day and day dummy variables. The second model was the variance of mean travel time (estimated by the residual squared from the first model) against one over the number of observations during a day and a time period. The models corroborate the existence of correlation and suggest that a high level of deployment doesn't improve guidance quality substantially due to the presence of correlation. On the contrary, the marginal improvement in the precision of link travel time estimates drops off after only a few observations per discrete time interval. Saricks et al. (1997) evaluated the ADVANCE ATIS project in the Chicago suburbs, which used probe vehicles to generate dynamic travel time information. The data gathered was then incorporated into a historic average link travel time database (by time of day) to provide shortest-time route to drivers. When compared to manually recorded travel data, 87.6 percent of probe values were within ± 5 sec, and 90 percent were within ± 10 sec, with substantial clustering within 2 sec or less. After two or three updates based on probe traversal data, the average profiles of travel times by time of day in the ADVANCE network became very accurate. Profiles based on probe data only were found to be more accurate than those based on both probe and detector data. Three probe reports per 5-min interval were adequate to provide reasonable travel time estimates and predictions on the arterial system. Increasing the number of probes and the frequency of reports only marginally improves estimation quality.
Information Providers
The provider of a traveler information service is inextricably linked with the objective used to decide how to disseminate that information. The appropriateness of the provider further depends on whether traveler information is a public or private good. Two criteria can help classify a good as public or private: excludability and rivalry. Excludability implies that the good's provider can prevent a user from obtaining it without charge. Rivalry implies that one person's consumption of a particular good prevents another individual from consuming it. Table 1 summarizes the goods by type.
Traveler information is potentially excludable assuming some sort of encrypted or scrambled communication system between information provider and information consumer. Information is in some senses non-rivalrous, one person's possession of information does not prevent another from having it.
However, one individual's possession of information may diminish its value for another. Scarce or unique information can be more valuable to its possessor than common knowledge. While the information itself may be non-rivalrous, the production of information is less so, there are limited computer resources, generating the information has some costs, for instance developing the route for consumer A may delay the computation for consumer B. Nevertheless, collecting, processing, and transmitting information all have a relatively high fixed cost, and a low (and not necessarily rising) variable cost. An infrastructure to collect, process, and distribute information must be constructed, but once constructed, adding an additional user is relatively inexpensive. Government information providers may choose to supply either a user optimal (UO) or a system optimal (SO) route to travelers. On first blush, it may seem that a welfare-maximizing jurisdiction should route people for the benefit of all, convincing people to engage in a socially optimal route. However, if that socially optimal route is noticeably inefficient for individual users, it likely will be ignored. Still, with the proper incentives to overcome the extra user time involved in engaging in a non-user optimal solution, travelers may be willing to choose that route. These incentives may be providing the information for free or at a discount compared to a private sector supplier, or even providing a cash rebate. However, if only a fraction of users switch from UO to SO routes, others will change their UO routes and overall no gain takes place. In contrast, private providers will likely provide users with user optimal routing information, or they will soon go out of business. We may see multiple information providers, the government providing free System Optimal information while private firms charge for User Optimal information.
Network Externalities
An information network becomes more valuable the more users it has providing real-time data. This is referred to as a network externality. The demand for this information (say from a real-time Electronic Route Guidance system) slopes downward (low demand at high prices, higher demand at lower prices) but shifts upward as the number of consumers rises. Complementarity between network components leads to network externalities (Economides 1996) . While drivers provide a negative externality to other drivers at the same time due to congestion, drivers a little ahead of you can tell you of traffic conditions. This information might encourage you to change your anticipated route and provide a positive externality if you share an information network. The more links which are covered by drivers in your information network, the greater the quantity, freshness, and accuracy of the information. Figure 1 constructs the revealed demand curves for positive network externalities. Let P(n; n e ) be the willingness to pay for the nth unit of the good when n e units are expected to be sold (assume each consumer purchases only one unit of the good). The network is more valuable the more units are sold. With only one consumer, (n=1), the network is not particularly valuable, so the implicit demand at n=1 (D 1 ) is low, lower than at D 2 , which is lower than D 3 , etc. Drawing a line between the number of consumers (n) and the implicit demand curve at that number (D n ) traces out an approximately parabolic shape, P(n, n). P(n, n) is the equilibrium price where the demand curve for a network of size n (D e ) intersects the vertical projection of the network size when the number of consumers (network size) is e. P(n, n) is thus the fulfilled expectations (or revealed demand) curve, the set of prices that the nth consumer would actually pay to join the network which would sustain n-consumers. The fulfilled expectations demand is increasing for small n if any one of three conditions hold: (1) "The utility of every consumer in a network of zero size is zero, or (2) there are immediate and large external benefits to network expansion for very small networks, or (3) there is a significant density of high-willingness-to-pay consumers who are just indifferent on joining a network of approximately zero size." Economides (1996) While demand rises with the number of members, thereby exhibiting positive critical mass under perfect competition, there is a saturation point, such that increasing the number of members does not add value. Such a system exhibits multiple equilibria (the largest of which is stable), and under perfect competition, the amount of network may be under-supplied because the positive externalities cannot be internalized to the producing firms. The model simulations later in this paper will trace how benefits change with club membership.
Network Coverage
This section estimates how many vehicles must be providing information to ensure a certain amount of network coverage. This is important for several reasons. First, it is essential to understand the costs of traveler information. If many probes are required, both upstream collection and communication costs will be higher. Second, it suggests the feasibility of the "club" model of information provision outlined in the previous section. Third, if it is infeasible, alternative collection methods, such as inroadway surveillance by a department of transportation, may be required.
To begin, we assume a uniform (or "flat") network with no hierarchy, so that each link is equally likely to be used. We also assume no spatial auto-correlation, so that links are used randomly. We apply the binomial theorem to estimate the likelihood that a road segment will be covered. We use the same information to estimate the expected number of vehicles that cover the link. For the purposes of this section, we will assume that a link is defined spatially and temporally. That is, a link has a location, but is only valid for a particular time slice (e.g. 10 seconds, 1 minute, 10 minutes, 1 hour). A vehicle traveling on a link three hours ago provides almost zero information about present conditions, for the purposes of this discussion, the link at time t-3 is a different link than the one at time t.
We compute the probability that a link is covered given n vehicles (or trials) and a probability p that a vehicle which is traveling is using a given a particular link (the probability of success). This probability can be interpreted as an information quality or level of service measure, which we denote as S:
The variable n, the number of vehicles required to meet a level of service standard, can be found by setting n = ln(S)/ln(1-p).
The expected value of the number of vehicles on a given link is simply the total number of vehicles on the network multiplied by the probability that any one of them is on that given link: n*p.
The actual value of p depends on the size of the metropolitan area, the number of links traversed by a given vehicle at some time divided by the total number of links. For instance, a driver may use 50 road segments on the trip to work between 8:00 and 8:30, in a metropolitan area of 100,000 road segments, in that case, p = 50/100000 = 0.0005. Of course, if we discard the assumption of equal use, we may have some very busy road segments used by a much higher segment of the population and some less used residential streets used by a much smaller segment. This is important, as it implies more coverage for the more important road segments and suggests that this simplistic approach overestimates the number of probe vehicles (n) necessary to provide information to achieve a particular coverage standard.
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the use of these equations to find the necessary number of probe vehicles to achieve a particular standard. Later sections will consider how much coverage is needed to achieve a given accuracy level and find the time saved. The time saved can be evaluated to estimate the willingness to pay for information. Figure 2 shows the number of probe vehicles needed to achieve a given service level (90% confidence that a link is covered to 99.9% confidence that a link is covered). The number of vehicles on the road in a given time slice to achieve this varies from 4600 to almost 14000 assuming a probability p of 0.0005. This number must be higher to cover more time slices, but lower if the level of service is only desired on particular important segments (for instance freeways). At for instance 4600 vehicles, and p=0.0005, each segment on average has 2.3 observations, at 14000 vehicles, each link averages 7
observations. The more observations the more reliable the information. Figure 3 twists the analysis to give the expected probability that a link is covered given the number of probe vehicles and the probability that any given vehicle will use a particular link. The more probe vehicles, the more likely a link will be covered, the more so the higher the probability that a particular vehicle uses a given link.
The number of sustainable clubs depends on the quality of the service provided. Above a certain size, a club ceases to increase very much in value with membership (how much more valuable is 99.99% than 99% probability of coverage), there may be room for a second (or n th club). For instance if sufficient quality is achieved with 20,000 members, and there are 60,000 people willing to join, then 3 clubs are potentially sustainable. While this analysis restricts itself to the value of traveler information, such a club has a number of operations in addition to collecting information, it must also collate and distribute it. It is not clear where the economies and diseconomies are in those operations.
The optimal number of clubs can be determined by trading off the additional benefits (including the increased coverage and economies of scale) associated with larger club size against the additional costs (including such things as loss of efficiency, increased span of control and information management problems). This cannot be numerically assessed without empirical data.
Modeling Approach
Modeling the effect of information from probes requires use of a simulation which probabilistically varies approach flow (we assume poisson arrivals), server rate, and the appearance of probes, which is random based on the share of probes in the fleet. The analysis presented here assumes a simple, two parallel link, network. For convenience, one link is called a "freeway" while the other is dubbed "arterial", though this is not meant to imply anything about their capacities or freeflow travel speeds. A driver who has an information system in his vehicle is labled informed, one who doesn't is called uninformed. Because of queueing externalities, both informed and uninformed drivers are affected by information. Informed drivers receive their information before deciding which of the two links to take.
While the average headway is simply 1/λ, each vehicle's simulated arrival headway (H v ) in seconds between vehicle v and v-1 is given by the following expression:
Where: RAND() = indicates a random real number between 0 and 1 λ = average arrival rate in vehicles per second
The expected travel time on each link, for informed drivers, is simply the length of the queue on the link at the time of arrival at the fork in the road (the decision point) multiplied by the average service rate. The expected time for uninformed drivers is based on history, but because of symmetry in service rates, we assume that it is the same for each link. Thus, uninformed drivers are equi-probable on either link. Travel distances are ignored and the queue is treated as an infinite capacity point queue. The average service rate is adjusted in the case of incidents as discussed below. The process is illustrated in Figure 4 .
The simulated service time (τ) in seconds per vehicle is given by the equation below:
where: τ v = service time for vehicle v τ = average service time in seconds, assumed to be 2 seconds unless otherwise given σ = service time range (sec), assumed to be 0.5 sec.
(This Random number is distinct from that in the previous equation).
This equation means that the service time for vehicle v is equal to a fixed (average) component τ plus a random component, which is between plus or minus 0.5*σ. Given the assumed values τ = 2 sec and σ = 0.5 sec, this means that service times vary smoothly and randomly between 1.75 and 2.25 sec.
Modeling Results
This section examines how congestion levels vary with how many drivers use ATIS and what percent of the fleet is comprised of probes. The percent of probes is important, because if only a few vehicles are probes, information will no longer be fresh. That is particularly pertinent when trying to save time from a stochastic process, like recurring congestion, because every second counts. It is likely to be less severe in the case of non-recurring congestion, which takes longer to clear. It is important to be able to identify what percent of the fleet needs to be probes to save time, as this will affect the cost. Another advantage of probes is that they can be implemented without government involvement because they do not necessarily rely on installing devices on the public right-of-way. However, if probes are the only source of information, problems can arise when information is no longer recent, misinformation can be worse than no information. This suggests that probes require a large critical mass to be successful, or that they are best used in combination with other sources. This section though assumes that only probes provide information, in order to determine where that critical mass arises. Clearly, intelligent combination of probe data with other sources may have advantages over using either source independently. Figure 5 shows the average travel time for informed drivers as the congestion level, and the percentage of probes on the network, increases from 0 to 100%. Figure 6 shows that result for the uninformed travelers. In these cases, the percent informed averages 50%, though samples are drawn equally from 30 runs each at 0%, 17%, 33%, 50%, 67%, 83%, and 100%. As noted before, informed drivers are best off if the information is not widely distributed, but uninformed drivers do benefit from wide distribution of information to others. Overall, information is a good thing for congestion. Note that the the network, the faster an incident will be detected, and the faster an over-reaction can be arrested.
Recurring Congestion
Informed travelers can save nearly 100% of the travel time, as they completely avoid the incident (though the link without the incident may still have some congestion). Furthermore, uninformed drivers save time too because the informed drivers don't exacerbate the queues on the affected link (the queue is half as long without the informed drivers) when they switch to the link without the incident. Before the incident, 50%
of travelers used each link and 50% were informed. After the incident, 75% will use the unaffected link (of whom 67% are informed) and 25% will use the affected link (of whom 0% are informed). While 75% on one link will lead to delay, this is much less delay than associated with the affected link. In all cases, more probes are better for the reasons noted above, though most gains can be achieved with a relatively low probe percentage (20% or less may be sufficient). The standard deviation increases with the decrease in capacity, but tends to decrease as the number of probes increases. Still, only a relatively small probe percentage is necessary to achieve most of the gains in reliability associated with information.
Summary and Conclusions
The private provision of traveler information, from data collection through distribution is an idea worth pursuing. The local Automobile Association (AA) for instance would seem an ideal organizational structure. We could imagine that service is provided as part of dues, where each user installs GPS and user-end communications, while the AA collects, warehouses, collates, and serves the information. This can skirt many of the institutional issues with government data collection that have been hampering realtime traffic information systems.
If information is supposed to be user optimal, it is intended to reduce the stochastic and inefficient nature of individual routing. But this notion that a third party, particularly a monopoly provider like the government, but even any large institution knows more about your route than you do would seem a classic case of what Hayek called the "fatal conceit". Errors will crop up undetected in the central analysis of information that a familiar individual driver will avoid from experience. Thus information provision is
probably best for what an individual won't know from routine behavior -dynamic incidents and unfamiliar territory. This qualitative conclusion that incidents and the unexpected are where the greatest gains from traveler information are to be found reinforces the results from our simulations. Those models show that a low level of probes can provide useful information by rapidly detecting incidents, while a much greater number is needed to provide any gains from recurring congestion.
This problem is even more severe when we note that several lags associated with this process affect the quality of the data. The first lag is between the production of information and its transmission to the collating center. The information is not collected about a segment until the vehicle has passed the segment, which makes it old. Transmission of the information is not instantaneous, but rather requires making a connection and sending a burst of data on the communication network. Information takes some time to aggregate and process. It is not sent until requested. A driver will need information for links between his present location and destination. He might not use many of those links for several minutes or even hours (on long trips), by which time the information is no longer valid. The dynamics are such that the path taken when chosen dynamically may not have been the best path to take in retrospect if perfect information were available.
As the costs of electronics and communications decline while congestion fails to abate, the market for in-vehicle navigation devices will grow. But the usefulness of those devices depend very much on the quality of data they employ. Current public sector data collection efforts are insufficient to fully realize the potential of ATIS. Alternatives such as private or quasi-public information clubs may provide an alternative which will exploit ATIS to its fullest. 
